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Abstract
We investigate multidimensional covering mechanism-design problems, wherein there are m
items that need to be covered and n agents who provide covering objects, with each agent i
having a private cost for the covering objects he provides. The goal is to select a set of covering
objects of minimum total cost that together cover all the items.
We focus on two representative covering problems: uncapacitated facility location (UFL)
and vertex cover (VC). For multidimensional UFL, we give a black-box method to transform any
Lagrangian-multiplier-preserving ρ-approximation algorithm for UFL to a truthful-in-expectation,
ρ-approx. mechanism. This yields the first result for multidimensional UFL, namely a truthful-
in-expectation 2-approximation mechanism.
For multidimensional VC (Multi-VC), we develop a decomposition method that reduces the
mechanism-design problem into the simpler task of constructing threshold mechanisms, which
are a restricted class of truthful mechanisms, for simpler (in terms of graph structure or problem
dimension) instances of Multi-VC. By suitably designing the decomposition and the threshold
mechanisms it uses as building blocks, we obtain truthful mechanisms with the following ap-
proximation ratios (n is the number of nodes): (1) O(r2 log n) for r-dimensional VC; and (2)
O(r log n) for r-dimensional VC on any proper minor-closed family of graphs (which improves to
O(log n) if no two neighbors of a node belong to the same player). These are the first truthful
mechanisms for Multi-VC with non-trivial approximation guarantees.
1 Introduction
Algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) deals with efficiently-computable algorithmic constructions
in the presence of strategic players who hold the inputs to the problem, and may misreport their
input if doing so benefits them. The challenge is to design algorithms that work well with the true
(privately-known) input. In order to achieve this task, a mechanism specifies both an algorithm
and a pricing or payment scheme that can be used to incentivize players to reveal their true inputs.
A mechanism is said to be truthful, if each player maximizes his utility by revealing his true input
regardless of the other players’ declarations.
In this paper, we initiate a study of multidimensional covering mechanism-design problems,
often called reverse auctions or procurement auctions in the mechanism-design literature. These
can be abstractly stated as follows. There are m items that need to be covered and n agents who
provide covering objects, with each agent i having a private cost for the covering objects he provides.
The goal is to select (or buy) a suitable set of covering objects from each player so that their union
covers all the items, and the total covering cost incurred is minimized. This cost-minimization
∗A preliminary version appeared as [24]. Theorem 13 in [24] is incorrect; the correct statements appear as
Theorem 4.10 and Corollary 4.11 here.
†{hminooei,cswamy}@math.uwaterloo.ca. Dept. of Combinatorics and Optimization, Univ. Waterloo, Waterloo,
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(CM) problem is equivalent to the social-welfare maximization (SWM) (where the social welfare
is − (total cost incurred by the players and the mechanism designer)), so ignoring computational
efficiency, the classical VCG mechanism [28, 4, 15] yields a truthful mechanism that always returns
an optimal solution. However, the CM problem is often NP-hard, so we seek to design a polytime
truthful mechanism where the underlying algorithm returns a near-optimal solution to the CM
problem.
Although multidimensional packing mechanism-design problems have received much attention
in the AMD literature, multidimensional covering CM problems are conspicuous by their absence in
the literature. For example, the packing SWM problem of combinatorial auctions has been studied
(in various flavors) in numerous works both from the viewpoint of designing polytime truthful,
approximation mechanisms [10, 21, 9, 13], and from the perspective of proving lower bounds on the
capabilities of computationally- (or query-) efficient truthful mechanisms [20, 14, 11]. In contrast,
the lack of study of multidimensional covering CM problems is aptly summarized by the blank
table entry for results on truthful approximations for procurement auctions in Fig. 11.2 in [27]
(a recent result of [12] is an exception; see “Related work”). In fact, to our knowledge, the only
multidimensional problem with a covering flavor that has been studied in the AMD literature is the
makespan-minimization problem on unrelated machines [26, 22, 2], which is not an SWM problem.
Our results and techniques. We study two representative multidimensional covering problems,
namely (metric) uncapacitated facility location (UFL), and vertex cover (VC), and develop various
techniques to devise polytime, truthful, approximation mechanisms for these problems.
For multidimensional UFL (Section 3), wherein players own (known) different facility sets and
the assignment costs are public, we present a black-box reduction from truthful mechanism design
to algorithm design. We show that any ρ-approximation algorithm for UFL satisfying an addi-
tional Lagrangian-multiplier-preserving (LMP) property (that indeed holds for various algorithms)
can be converted in a black-box fashion to a truthful-in-expectation ρ-approximation mechanism
(Theorem 3.1). This is the first such black-box reduction for a multidimensional covering prob-
lem, and it leads to the first result for multidimensional UFL, namely, a truthful-in-expectation, 2-
approximation mechanism. Our result builds upon the convex-decomposition technique in [21]. Lavi
and Swamy [21] primarily focus on packing problems, but remark that their convex-decomposition
idea also yields results for single-dimensional covering problems, and leave open the problem of ob-
taining results for multidimensional covering problems. Our result for UFL identifies an interesting
property under which a ρ-approximation algorithm for a covering problem can be transformed into
a truthful, ρ-approximation mechanism in the multidimensional setting.
In Section 4, we consider multidimensional VC, where each player owns a (known) set of nodes.
Although, algorithmically, VC is one of the simplest covering problems, it becomes a surprisingly
challenging mechanism-design problem in the multidimensional mechanism-design setting, and, in
fact, seems significantly more difficult than multidimensional UFL. This is in stark contrast with
the single-dimensional setting, where each player owns a single node. Before detailing our results
and techniques, we mention some of the difficulties encountered. We use Multi-VC to distinguish
the multidimensional mechanism-design problem from the algorithmic problem.
For single-dimensional problems, a simple monotonicity condition characterizes the imple-
mentability of an algorithm, that is, whether it can be combined with suitable payments to obtain a
truthful mechanism. This condition allows for ample flexibility and various algorithm-design tech-
niques can be leveraged to design monotone algorithms for both covering and packing problems
(see, e.g., [3, 21]). For single-dimensional VC, many of the known 2-approximation algorithms for
the algorithmic problem (based on LP-rounding, primal-dual methods, or combinatorial methods)
are either already monotone, or can be modified in simple ways so that they become monotone, and
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thereby yield truthful 2-approximation mechanisms [7]. However, the underlying algorithm-design
techniques fail to yield algorithms satisfying weak monotonicity (WMON)—a necessary condition
for implementability (see Theorem 2)—even for the simplest multidimensional setting, namely, 2-
dimensional VC, where every player owns at most two nodes. We show this for various LP-rounding
methods in Appendix B, and for primal-dual algorithms in Appendix C.
Furthermore, various techniques that have been devised for designing polytime truthful mech-
anisms for multidimensional packing problems (such as combinatorial auctions) do not seem to be
helpful for Multi-VC. For instance, the well-known technique of constructing a maximal-in-range,
or more generally, a maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) mechanism—fix some subset of out-
comes and return the best outcome in this set—does not work for Multi-VC [12] (and more generally,
for multidimensional covering problems). (More precisely, any algorithm for Multi-VC whose range
is a proper subset of the collection of minimal vertex covers, cannot have bounded approxima-
tion ratio.) This also rules out the convex-decomposition technique of [21], which we exploit for
multidimensional UFL, because, as noted in [21], this yields an MIDR mechanism.
Thus, we need to develop new techniques to attack Multi-VC (and multidimensional covering
problems in general). We devise two main techniques for Multi-VC. We introduce a simple class
of truthful mechanisms called threshold mechanisms (Section 4.1), and show that despite their
restrictions, threshold mechanisms can achieve non-trivial approximation guarantees. We next
develop a decomposition method for Multi-VC (Section 4.2) that provides a general way of reducing
the mechanism-design problem for Multi-VC into simpler—either in terms of graph structure, or
problem dimension—mechanism-design problems by using threshold mechanisms as building blocks.
We believe that these techniques will also find use in other mechanism-design problems.
By leveraging the decomposition method along with threshold mechanisms, we obtain various
truthful, approximation mechanisms for Multi-VC, which yield the first truthful mechanisms for
multidimensional vertex cover with non-trivial approximation guarantees. Let n be the number
of nodes. Our decomposition method shows that any instance of r-dimensional VC can be broken
up into O(r2 log n) instances of single-dimensional VC; this in turn leads to a truthful, O(r2 log n)-
approximation mechanism for r-dimensional VC (Theorem 4.8). In particular, for any fixed r, we
obtain an O(log n)-approximation for any graph. We give another decomposition method that
yields an improved truthful, O(r log n)-approximation mechanism (Theorem 4.10) for any proper
minor-closed family of graphs (such as planar graphs). This guarantee improves to O(log n) for any
proper minor-closed family, when no two neighbors of a node belong to the same player.
It is worthwhile to note that in addition to their usefulness in the design of truthful, ap-
proximation mechanisms for Multi-VC, some of the mechanisms we design also enjoy good frugality
properties. We obtain (Theorem 4.13) the first mechanisms for Multi-VC that are polytime, truthful
and simultaneously achieve bounded approximation ratio and bounded frugality ratio with respect
to the benchmarks in [5, 19]. This nicely complements a result of [5], who devise such a mechanism
for single-dimensional VC.
Related work. As mentioned earlier, there is little prior work on the CM problem for multidi-
mensional covering problems. Dughmi and Roughgarden [12] give a general technique to convert an
FPTAS for an SWM problem to a truthful-in-expectation FPTAS. However, for covering problems,
they obtain an additive approximation, which does not translate to a (worst-case) multiplicative
approximation. In fact, as they observe, a multiplicative approximation ratio is impossible (in
polytime) using their technique, or any other technique that constructs a MIDR mechanism whose
range is a proper subset of all outcomes.
For single-dimensional covering problems, various other results, including black-box results, are
known. Briest et al. [3] consider a closely-related generalization, which one may call the “single-value
3
setting”; although this is a multidimensional setting, it admits a simple monotonicity condition suf-
ficient for implementability, which makes this setting easier to deal with than our multidimensional
settings. They show that a pseudopolynomial time algorithm (for covering and packing problems)
can be converted into a truthful FPTAS. Lavi and Swamy [21] mainly consider packing problems,
but mention that their technique also yields results for single-dimensional covering problems.
Single-dimensional covering problems have been well studied from the perspective of frugality.
Here the goal is to design mechanisms that have bounded (over-)payment with respect to some
benchmark, but one does not (typically) care about the cost of the solution returned. Starting
with the work of Archer and Tardos [1], various benchmarks for frugality have been proposed
and investigated for various problems including VC, k-edge-disjoint paths, spanning tree, s-t cut;
see [18, 6, 19, 5] and the references therein. Some of our mechanisms for Multi-VC are inspired by
the constructions in [19, 5], and simultaneously achieve bounded approximation ratio and bounded
frugality ratio.
Our decomposition method, where we combine mechanisms for simpler problems into a mech-
anism for the given problem, is somewhat in the same spirit as the construction in [25]. They
give a toolkit for combining truthful mechanisms, identifying sufficient conditions under which this
combination preserves truthfulness. But they work only with the single-dimensional setting, which
is much more tractable to deal with.
Finally, as noted earlier, there are a wide variety of results on truthful mechanism-design for
packing SWM problems, such as combinatorial auctions [10, 21, 9, 13, 20, 14, 11].
2 Preliminaries
In a multidimensional covering mechanism-design problem, we havem items that need to be covered,
and n agents/players who provide covering objects. Each agent i provides a set Ti of covering
objects. All this information is public knowledge. We use [k] to denote the set {1, . . . , k}. Each
agent i has a private cost (or type) vector ci = {ci,v}v∈Ti , where ci,v is the cost he incurs for providing
object v ∈ Ti; for T ⊆ Ti, we use ci(T ) to denote
∑
v∈T ci,v. A feasible solution or allocation selects a
subset Ti ⊆ Ti for each agent i, denoting that i provides the objects in Ti. Given this solution, each
agent i incurs the private cost ci(Ti). Also, the mechanism designer incurs a publicly-known cost
pub(T1, . . . , Tn). The goal is to minimize the total cost
∑
i ci(Ti) + pub(T1, . . . , Tn) incurred. We
call this the cost minimization (CM) problem. Note that we can encode any feasibility constraints
in the covering problem by simply setting pub(a) = ∞ if a is not a feasible allocation. Observe
that if we view the mechanism designer also as a player, then the CM problem is equivalent to
maximizing the social welfare, which is given by
∑
i−ci(Ti)− pub(T1, . . . , Tn).
Various covering problems can be cast in the above framework. For example, in the mechanism-
design version of vertex cover (Section 4), the items are edges of a graph. Each agent i provides a
subset Ti of the nodes of the graph and incurs a private cost ci,v if node v ∈ Ti is used to cover an
edge. We can set pub(T1, . . . , Tn) = 0 if
⋃
i Ti is a vertex cover, and ∞ otherwise, to encode that
the solution must be a vertex cover. It is also easy to see that the mechanism-design version of
uncapacitated facility location (UFL; Section 3), where each agent provides some facilities and has
private facility-opening costs, and the client-assignment costs are public, can be modeled by letting
pub(T1, . . . , Tn) be the total client-assignment cost given the set
⋃
i Ti of open facilities.
Let Ci denote the set of all possible cost functions of agent i, and O be the (finite) set of
all possible allocations. Let C =
∏n
i=1Ci. For a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn), we use x−i to denote
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Similarly, let C−i =
∏
j 6=iCj . For an allocation a = (T1, . . . , Tn), we
sometimes use ai to denote Ti, ci(a) to denote ci(ai) = ci(Ti). A (direct revelation) mechanism
M = (A, p1, . . . , pn) for a covering problem consists of an allocation algorithm A : C 7→ O and a
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payment function pi : C 7→ R for each agent i, and works as follows. Each agent i reports a cost
function ci (that might be different from his true cost function). The mechanism computes the
allocation A(c) = (T1, . . . , Tn), and pays pi(c) to each agent i. Throughout, we use ci to denote the
true cost function of i. The utility ui(ci, c−i; ci) that player i derives when he reports ci and the
others report c−i is pi(c)− ci(Ti), and each agent i aims to maximize his own utility (rather than
the social welfare).
A desirable property for a mechanism to satisfy is truthfulness, wherein every agent i maximizes
his utility by reporting his true cost function. All our mechanisms will also satisfy the natural
property of individual rationality (IR), which means that every agent has nonnegative utility if he
reports his true cost.
Definition 2.1 A mechanism M =
(A, {pi}) is truthful if for every agent i, every c−i ∈ C−i, and
every ci, ci ∈ Ci, we have ui(ci, c−i; ci) ≥ ui(ci, c−i; ci). M is IR if for every i, every ci ∈ Ci and
every c−i ∈ C−i, we have ui(ci, c−i; ci) ≥ 0.
To ensure that truthfulness and IR are compatible, we consider monopoly-free settings: for
every player i, there is a feasible allocation a (i.e., pub(a) < ∞) with ai = ∅. (Otherwise, if there
is no such allocation, then i needs to be paid at least minv∈Ti ci,v for IR, so he can lie and increase
his utility arbitrarily.)
For a randomized mechanism M , where A or the pi’s are randomized, we say that M is truthful
in expectation if each agent i maximizes his expected utility by reporting his true cost. We now
say that M is IR if for every coin toss of the mechanism, the utility of each agent is nonnegative
upon bidding truthfully.
Since the CM problem is often NP-hard, our goal is to design a mechanism M =
(A, {pi}) that
is truthful (or truthful in expectation), and where A is a ρ-approximation algorithm; that is, for
every input c, the solution a = A(c) satisfies ∑i ci(a) + pub(a) ≤ ρ · minb∈O(∑i ci(b) + pub(b)).
We call such a mechanism a truthful, ρ-approximation mechanism.
The following theorem gives a necessary and sometimes sufficient condition for when an algo-
rithm A is implementable, that is, admits suitable payment functions {pi} such that
(A, {pi}) is
a truthful mechanism. Say that A satisfies weak monotonicity (WMON) if for all i, all ci, c′i ∈ Ci,
and all c−i ∈ C−i, if A(ci, c−i) = a, A(c′i, c−i) = b, then ci(a) − ci(b) ≤ c′i(a) − c′i(b). De-
fine the dimension of a covering problem to be maxi |Ti|. It is easy to see that for a single-
dimensional covering problem—so Ci ⊆ R for all i—WMON is equivalent to the following sim-
pler condition: say that A is monotone if for all i, all ci, c′i ∈ Ci, ci ≤ c′i, and all c−i ∈
C−i, if A(ci, c−i) = a, A(c′i, c−i) = b then bi ⊆ ai.
Theorem 2.2 (Theorems 9.29 and 9.36 in [27]) If a mechanism
(A, {pi}) is truthful, then A
satisfies WMON. Conversely, if the problem is single-dimensional, or if Ci is convex for all i, then
every WMON algorithm A is implementable.
3 A black-box reduction for multidimensional metric UFL
In this section, we consider the multidimensional metric uncapacitated facility location (UFL) prob-
lem and present a black-box reduction from truthful mechanism design to algorithm design. We show
that any ρ-approximation algorithm for UFL satisfying an additional property can be converted in a
black-box fashion to a truthful-in-expectation ρ-approximation mechanism (Theorem 3.1). This is
the first such result for a multidimensional covering problem. As a corollary, we obtain a truthful-
in-expectation, 2-approximation mechanism (Corollary 3.3).
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In the mechanism-design version of UFL, we have a set D of clients that need to be serviced
by facilities, and a set F of locations where facilities may be opened. Each agent i may provide
facilities at the locations in Ti ⊆ F . By making multiple copies of a location if necessary, we may
assume that the Tis are disjoint. Hence, we will simply say “facility `” to refer to the facility at
location ` ∈ F . For each facility ` ∈ Ti that is opened, i incurs a private opening cost of f i,`, and
assigning client j to an open facility ` incurs a publicly known assignment/connection cost c`j . To
simplify notation, given a tuple {fi,`}i∈[n],`∈Ti of facility costs, we use f` to denote fi,` for ` ∈ Ti.
The goal is to open a subset F ⊆ F of facilities, so as to minimize ∑`∈F f ` +∑j∈Dmin`∈F c`j . We
will assume throughout that the c`js form a metric. It will be notationally convenient to allow our
algorithms to have the flexibility of choosing the open facility σ(j) to which a client j is assigned
(instead of argmin`∈F c`j); since assignment costs are public, this does not affect truthfulness, and
any approximation guarantee achieved also clearly holds when we drop this flexibility.
We can formulate (metric) UFL as an integer program, and relax the integrality constraints to
obtain the following LP. Throughout, we use ` to index facilities in F and j to index clients in D.
min
∑
`
f`y` +
∑
j,`
c`jx`j s.t.
∑
`
x`j ≥ 1 ∀j, 0 ≤ x`j ≤ y` ≤ 1 ∀`, j. (FL-P)
Here, {f`}` = {fi,`}i∈[n],`∈Ti is the vector of reported facility costs. Variable y` denotes if facility
` is opened, and x`j denotes if client j is assigned to facility `; the constraints encode that each
client is assigned to a facility, and that this facility must be open.
Say that an algorithmA is a Lagrangian multiplier preserving (LMP) ρ-approximation algorithm
for UFL if for every instance, it returns a solution
(
F, {σ(j)}j∈D
)
such that ρ
∑
`∈F f`+
∑
j cσ(j)j ≤
ρ ·OPT(FL-P). The main result of this section is the following black-box reduction.
Theorem 3.1 Given a polytime, LMP ρ-approximation algorithm A for UFL, one can construct a
polytime, truthful-in-expectation, individually rational, ρ-approximation mechanism M for multidi-
mensional UFL.
Proof : We build upon the convex-decomposition idea used in [21]. The randomized mechanism
M works as follows. Let f = {f`} be the vector of reported facility-opening costs, and c be the
public connection-cost metric.
1. Compute the optimal solution (y∗, x∗) to (FL-P) (for the input (f, c)). Let {p∗i = p∗i (f)} be
the payments made by the fractional VCG mechanism that outputs the optimal LP solution for
every input. That is, p∗i =
(∑
` f`y
′
` +
∑
`,j c`jx
′
`j
)− (∑`/∈Ti f`y∗` +∑`,j c`jx∗`j), where (y′, x′) is
the optimal solution to (FL-P) with the additional constraints y` = 0 for all ` ∈ Ti.
2. Let Z(P ) = {(y(q), x(q))}q∈I be the set of all integral solutions to (FL-P). In Lemma 3.2, we
prove the key technical result that using A, one can compute, in polynomial time, nonnegative
multipliers {λ(q)}q∈I such that
∑
q λ
(q) = 1,
∑
q λ
(q)y
(q)
` = y
∗
` for all `, and
∑
q,`,j λ
(q)c`jx
(q)
`j ≤
ρ
∑
`,j c`jx
∗
`j .
3. With probability λ(q): (a) output the solution
(
y(q), x(q)
)
; (b) pay p
(q)
i to agent i, where p
(q)
i = 0
if
∑
`∈Ti f`y
∗
` = 0, and
∑
`∈Ti f`y
(q)
` ·
p∗i∑
`∈Ti f`y
∗
`
otherwise.
Clearly, M runs in polynomial time. Fix a player i. Let f i and fi be the true and reported cost
vector of i. Let f−i be the reported cost vectors of the other players. Let (y∗, x∗) be an optimal
solution to (FL-P) for (f, c). Note that E
[
pi(f)
]
= p∗i (f) If
∑
`∈Ti f`y
∗
` = 0 then this follows since
p∗i (f) = 0 (because then (y
∗, x∗) is also an optimal solution to (FL-P) when player i does not
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participate). Otherwise, this follows since
∑
q λ
(q)y(q) = y∗` for all `. So E
[
ui(fi, fi; f i)
]
= E
[
pi
]−∑
q λ
(q)
∑
`∈Ti f `y
(q)
` = p
∗
i (f)−
∑
`∈Ti f `y
∗
` where the last equality is again because
∑
q λ
(q)y(q) = y∗`
for all `. Since p∗i and y
∗ are respectively the payment to i and the assignment computed for input
(fi, f−i) by the fractional VCG mechanism, which is truthful, it follows that player i maximizes his
utility in the VCG mechanism, and hence, his expected utility under mechanism M , by reporting
his true opening costs. Thus, M is truthful in expectation.
This also implies the ρ-approximation guarantee because the convex decomposition obtained in
Step 2 shows that the expected cost of the solution computed by M for input (f, c) (where we may
assume that f is the true cost vector) is at most ρ · OPT(FL-P)(f, c). Finally, since the fractional
VCG mechanism is IR, for any agent i, the VCG payment p∗i (f) satisfies p
∗
i (f) ≥
∑
`∈Ti f`y
∗
` , and
therefore p
(q)
i ≥
∑
`∈Ti f`y
(q)
` . So M is IR.
Lemma 3.2 The convex decomposition in step 2 can be computed in polytime.
Proof : It suffices to show that the LP (P) can be solved in polynomial time and its optimal value
is 1. Recall that {(y(q), x(q))}q∈I is the set of all integral solutions to (FL-P).
max
∑
q
λ(q) (P)
s.t.
∑
q
λ(q)y
(q)
` = y
∗
` ∀` (1)∑
j,`,q
λ(q)c`jx
(q)
`j ≤ ρ
∑
j,`
c`jx
∗
`j (2)∑
q
λ(q) ≤ 1 (3)
λ ≥ 0.
min
∑
`
y∗`α` +
(
ρ
∑
j,`
c`jx
∗
`j
)
β + z (D)
s.t.
∑
`
y
(q)
` α` +
(∑
j,`
c`jx
(q)
`j
)
β + z ≥ 1 ∀q (4)
z, β ≥ 0.
Since (P) has an exponential number of variables, we consider the dual (D). Here the α`s, β
and z are the dual variables corresponding to constraints (1), (2), and (3) respectively. Clearly,
OPT (D) ≤ 1 since z = 1, α` = 0 = β for all ` is a feasible dual solution. If there is a feasible dual
solution (α′, β′, z′) of value smaller than 1, then the rough idea is that by running A on the UFL
instance with facility costs {α′`ρ } and connection costs {β′c`j}, we can obtain an integral solution
whose constraint (4) is violated. (This idea needs be modified a bit since α′` could be negative;
see below.) Hence, we can solve (D) efficiently via the ellipsoid method using A to provide the
separation oracle. This also yields an equivalent dual LP consisting of only the polynomially many
violated inequalities found during the ellipsoid method. The dual of this compact LP gives an LP
equivalent to (P) with polynomially many λ(q) variables whose solution yields the desired convex
decomposition.
We now fill in the details. Suppose (α′, β′, z′) is feasible to (D) and
∑
` y
∗
`α
′
`+(ρ
∑
j,` c`jx
∗
`j)β
′+
z′ < 1. Define a+ := max(0, a); for a vector v = (v1, . . . , vn), define v+ := (v+1 , . . . , v
+
n ). Consider
the UFL instance with facility costs {f ′` = α′+` /ρ} and connection costs {c′`j = β′c`j}. (Clearly c′ is
also a metric.) Running A on this input, we can obtain an integral solution (y(q), x(q)) such that
ρ
∑
`
α
′+
`
ρ y
(q)
` +
∑
j,`
β′c`jx
(q)
`j ≤ ρ ·OPT(FL-P)(f ′, c′) ≤ ρ
(∑
`
α
′+
`
ρ y
∗
` +
∑
j,`
β′c`jx∗`j
)
.
Clearly the facilities ` with α′` ≤ 0 contribute 0 to the LHS and RHS of the above inequality. Now
consider the integer solution yˆ(q) where yˆ
(q)
` is 1 if α
′
` ≤ 0 and is y∗` otherwise. Adding
∑
`:α′`≤0 α
′
`yˆ
(q)
`
7
to the LHS and
∑
`:α′`≤0 α
′
`y
∗
` to the RHS of the above inequality, since y
∗
` ≤ 1 for all ` and α
′+
` = α
′
`
when α′` > 0, we infer that∑
`
α′`yˆ
(q)
` +
∑
j,`
β′c`jx
(q)
`j ≤
∑
`
α′`y
∗
` +
(
ρ
∑
j,`
c`jx
∗
`j
)
β′ < 1− z′
which contradicts that (α′, β′, z′) is feasible to (D). Hence, OPT (D) = OPT (P) = 1.
Thus, we can add the constraint
∑
` y
∗
`α` + (ρ
∑
j,` c`jx
∗
`j)β + z ≤ 1 to (D) without altering
anything. If we solve the resulting LP using the ellipsoid method, and take the inequalities corre-
sponding to the violated inequalities (4) found by A during the ellipsoid method, then we obtain a
compact LP with only a polynomial number of constraints that is equivalent to (D). The dual of
this compact LP yields an LP equivalent to (P) with a polynomial number of λ(q) variables which
we can solve to obtain the desired convex decomposition.
By using the polytime LMP 2-approximation algorithm for UFL devised by Jain et al. [17], we
obtain the following corollary of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.3 There is a polytime, IR, truthful-in-expectation, 2-approximation mechanism for
multidimensional UFL.
4 Truthful mechanisms for multidimensional VC
We now consider the multidimensional vertex-cover problem (VC), and devise various polytime,
truthful, approximation mechanisms for it. We often use Multi-VC to distinguish multidimensional
VC from its algorithmic counterpart.
Recall that in Multi-VC, we have a graph G = (V,E) with n nodes. Each agent i provides a
subset Ti of nodes. For simplicity, we first assume that the Tis are disjoint, and given a cost-vector
{ci,u}i∈[n],u∈Ti , we use cu to denote ci,u for u ∈ Ti. Notice that monopoly-free then means that
each Ti is an independent set. In Remark 4.6 we argue that many of the results obtained in this
disjoint-Tis setting (in particular, Theorems 4.8 and 4.10) also hold when the Tis are not disjoint
(but each Ti is still an independent set). The goal is to choose a minimum-cost vertex cover, i.e., a
min-cost set S ⊆ V such that every edge is incident to a node in S.
As mentioned earlier, VC becomes a rather challenging mechanism-design problem in the mul-
tidimensional mechanism-design setting. Whereas for single-dimensional VC, many of the known
2-approximation algorithms for VC are implementable, none of these underlying techniques yield
implementable algorithms even for the simplest multidimensional setting, 2-dimensional VC, where
every player owns at most two nodes; see Appendix B and C for examples. Moreover, no maximal-
in-distributional-range (MIDR) mechanism whose range is a proper subset of all outcomes can
achieve a bounded multiplicative approximation guarantee [12].1 This also rules out the convex-
decomposition technique of [21], which yields MIDR mechanisms.
We develop two main techniques for Multi-VC in this section. In Section 4.1, we introduce a
simple class of truthful mechanisms called threshold mechanisms, and show that although seem-
ingly restricted, threshold mechanisms can achieve non-trivial approximation guarantees. In Sec-
tion 4.2, we develop a decomposition method for Multi-VC that uses threshold mechanisms as building
blocks and gives a general way of reducing the mechanism-design problem for Multi-VC into simpler
mechanism-design problems.
1If A is a randomized MIDR algorithm and S is an inclusion-wise minimal vertex cover such that the range of A
does not include a distribution that returns S with probability 1, then A incurs non-zero cost on the instance where
the cost of a node u is 0 if u ∈ S and is 1 (say) otherwise, and so its approximation ratio is unbounded.
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By leveraging the decomposition method along with threshold mechanisms, we obtain various
truthful, approximation mechanisms for Multi-VC, which yield the first truthful mechanisms for
multidimensional vertex cover with non-trivial approximation guarantees. (1) We show that any
instance of r-dimensional VC can be decomposed into O(r2 log n) single-dimensional VC instances;
this leads to a truthful, O(r2 log n)-approximation mechanism for r-dimensional VC (Theorem 4.8).
In particular, for any fixed r, we obtain an O(log n)-approximation. (2) For any proper minor-closed
family of graphs (such as planar graphs), we obtain an improved truthful, O(r log n)-approximation
mechanism (Theorem 4.10); this improves to an O(log n)-approximation if no two neighbors of a
node belong to the same agent (Corollary 4.11).
Theorem 4.13 shows that our mechanisms also enjoy good frugality properties. We obtain the
first mechanisms for Multi-VC that are polytime, truthful, and achieve bounded approximation ratio
and bounded frugality ratio. This nicely complements a result of [5], who devise such mechanisms
for single-dimensional VC.
4.1 Threshold Mechanisms
Definition 4.1 A threshold mechanism M for Multi-VC works as follows. On input c, for every i
and every node u ∈ Ti, M computes a threshold tu = tu(c−i) (i.e., tu does not depend on i’s reported
costs). M then returns the solution S = {v ∈ V : cv ≤ tv} as the output, and pays pi =
∑
u∈S∩Ti tu
to agent i.
If tu only depends on the costs in the neighbor-set N(u) of u, for all u ∈ V (note that N(u)∩Ti = ∅
if u ∈ Ti), we call M a neighbor-threshold mechanism. A special case of a neighbor-threshold
mechanism is an edge-threshold mechanism: for every edge uv ∈ E we have edge thresholds t(uv)u =
t
(uv)
u (cv), t
(uv)
v = t
(uv)
v (cu), and the threshold of a node u is given by tu = maxv∈N(u)(t
(uv)
u ).
In general, threshold mechanisms may not output a vertex cover, however it is easy to argue
that threshold mechanisms are always truthful and IR.
Lemma 4.2 Every threshold mechanism for Multi-VC is IR and truthful.
Proof : IR is immediate from the definition of payments. To see truthfulness, fix an agent i. For
every ci, ci ∈ Ci, c−i ∈ C−i we have ui(ci, c−i; ci) =
∑
v∈Ti:cv≤tv(tv − cv). It follows that i’s utility is
maximized by reporting ci = ci.
Inspired by [19, 5], we define an x-scaled edge-threshold mechanism as follows: fix a vector
(xu)u∈V , where xu > 0 for all u, and set t
(uv)
u := xucv/xv for every edge (u, v). We abuse notation
and use Ax to denote both the resulting edge-threshold mechanism and its allocation algorithm.
Also, define Bx to be the neighbor-threshold mechanism where we set tu :=
∑
v∈N(u) xucv/xv.
Define α(G;x) := maxu∈V
(
maxS⊆N(u):S independent
x(S)
xu
)
.
Lemma 4.3 Ax and Bx output feasible solutions and have a tight approximation ratio α(G;x)+1.
Proof : Clearly, every node selected by Ax is also selected by Bx. So it suffices to show that Ax is
feasible, and to show the approximation ratio for Bx. For any edge (u, v), either cu ≤ xucv/xv and
u is output, or cv ≤ xvcu/xu and v is output. So Ax returns a vertex cover.
Let S be the output of Bx on input c, and let S∗ be a min-cost vertex cover. We have
c(S) = c(S ∩ S∗) + c(S \ S∗) ≤ c(S∗) + ∑u∈S\S∗ tu = c(S∗) + ∑u∈S\S∗∑v∈N(u) xucv/xv. Note
that S \ S∗ is an independent set since S∗ is a vertex cover, so ∑u∈S\S∗∑v∈N(u) xucv/xv ≤
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∑
v∈S∗
cv
xv
∑
u∈N(v)capS∗ xu ≤
∑
v∈S∗ cv · α(G;x). Hence c(S) ≤ (α(G;x) + 1)c(S∗). The tightness
of the approximation guarantee follows from Example 1 below.
Corollary 4.4 (i) Setting x = ~1 gives α(G;x) ≤ ∆(G), which is the maximum degree of a node in
G, so A~1 has approximation ratio at most ∆(G) + 1.
(ii) Taking x to be the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue λmax of the adjacency
matrix of G (x > 0 by the Perron-Frobenius theorem) gives α(G;x) ≤ λmax (see [5]), so Ax has
approximation ratio λmax + 1.
Example 1 (Tightness of approximation ratio of Ax and Bx) Let u and S ⊆ N(u) achieve
the maximum in the definition of α(G;x). Now consider the instance (G, c) where cu = xu, cv = xv
for all v ∈ S and cw = 0 for all w ∈ V \ ({u} ∪ S). The mechanism Ax will choose {u} ∪ S in the
output, whereas V \ S is a vertex cover of cost cu = xu. So, Ax has approximation ratio at least
xu+x(S)
xu
= 1 + α(G;x).
Although neighbor-threshold mechanisms are more general than edge-threshold mechanisms,
Lemma 4.5 (proved in Appendix A) shows that this yields limited dividends in the approximation
ratio. Define α′(G) = minorientations of G
(
maxu∈V,S⊆N in(u):S independent |S|
)
, where N in(u) = {v ∈
N(u) : (u, v) is directed into u}. Note that α′(G) ≤ α(G;~1) ≤ ∆(G). If G = (V,E) is everywhere
γ-sparse, i.e., |{(u, v) ∈ E : u, v ∈ S}| ≤ γ|S| for all S ⊆ V , then α′(G) ≤ γ; this follows from
Hakimi’s theorem [16]. A well-known result in graph theory states that for every proper family
G of graphs that is closed under taking minors (e.g., planar graphs), there is a constant γ, such
that every G ∈ G is has at most γ|V (G)| edges [23] (see also [8], Chapter 7, Exer. 20); since G is
minor-closed, this also implies that G is everywhere γ-sparse, and hence α′(G) ≤ γ for all G ∈ G.
Lemma 4.5 A (feasible) neighbor-threshold mechanism M for graph G with approximation ratio
ρ, yields an O
(
ρ log(α′(G))
)
-approximation edge-threshold mechanism for G. This implies an ap-
proximation ratio of (i) O(ρ log γ) if G is an everywhere γ-sparse graph; (ii) O(ρ) if G belongs to a
proper minor-closed family of graphs (where the constant in the O(.) depends on the graph family).
Remark 4.6 Any neighbor-threshold mechanism M with approximation ratio ρ that works under
the disjoint-Tis assumption can be modified to yield a truthful, ρ-approximation mechanism when
we drop this assumption. Let Au = {i : u ∈ Ti}. Set cˆu = mini∈Au ci,u for each u ∈ V and let tˆu
be the neighbor-threshold of u for the input cˆ. Note that tˆu depends only on c−i for every i ∈ Au.
Set tiu := min{tˆu,minj 6=i:u∈Tj cj,u} for all i, u ∈ Ti. Consider the threshold mechanism M ′ with {tiu}
thresholds, where we use a fixed tie-breaking rule to ensure that we pick u for at most one agent
i ∈ Au with ci,u = tiu. Then the outputs of M on c, and of M ′ on input cˆ coincide. Thus, M ′ is a
truthful, ρ-approximation mechanism.
4.2 A decomposition method
We now propose a general reduction method for Multi-VC that uses threshold mechanisms as build-
ing blocks to reduce the task of designing truthful mechanisms for Multi-VC to the task of designing
threshold mechanisms for simpler (in terms of graph structure or the dimensionality of the prob-
lem) Multi-VC problems. This reduction is useful because designing good threshold mechanisms
appears to be a much more tractable task for Multi-VC. By utilizing the threshold mechanisms
designed in Section 4.1 in our decomposition method, we obtain an O(log n)-approximation mech-
anism for any proper minor-closed family of graphs, and an O(r2 log n)-approximation mechanism
for r-dimensional VC.
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A decomposition mechanism M for G = (V,E) is constructed as follows.
– Let G1, . . . , Gk be subgraphs of G such that
⋃k
q=1E(Gq) = E,
– Let M1, . . . ,Mk be threshold mechanisms for G1, . . . , Gk respectively. For any v ∈ V , let tqv be
v’s threshold in Mq if v ∈ V (Gi), and 0 otherwise.
– Define M to be the threshold mechanism obtained by setting the threshold for each node v to
tv := maxq=1,...,k(t
q
v) for any v ∈ V . The payments of M are then as specified in Definition 4.1.
Notice that if all the Mis are neighbor threshold mechanisms, then so is M .
Lemma 4.7 The decomposition mechanism M described above is IR and truthful. If ρ1, . . . , ρk are
the approximation ratios of M1, . . . ,Mk respectively, then M has approximation ratio
(∑
q ρq
)
.
Proof : Since M is a threshold mechanism, it is IR and truthful by Lemma 4.2. The optimal
vertex cover for G induces a vertex cover for each subgraph Gq. So Mq outputs a vertex cover Sq
of cost at most ρq · OPT , where OPT is the optimal vertex-cover cost for G. It is clear that M
outputs
⋃
q Sq, which has cost at most
(∑
q ρq
) ·OPT .
Theorem 4.8 For any r-dimensional instance of Multi-VC on G = (V,E), one can obtain a poly-
time, O(r2 log |V |)-approximation, decomposition mechanism, even when the Tis are not disjoint.
Proof : We decompose G into single-dimensional subgraphs, by which we mean subgraphs that
contain at most one node from each Ti. Initialize j = 1, Vj = ∅. While,
⋃j−1
q=1E(Gq) 6= E, we do
the following: for every agent i, we pick one of the nodes of Ti uniformly at random and add it to
Vj . We also add all the nodes in V \
(⋃n
i=1 Ti
)
to Vj . Let Gj be the induced subgraph on Vj ; set
j ← j + 1.
For any edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, the probability that both u, v appear in some subgraph Gj is at
least 1/r2. So, the expected value of |E\⋃j−1q=1E(Gq)| decreases by a factor of at least (1−1/r2) with
j. Hence, the expected number of subgraphs produced above is O
( log |E|
log(r2/(r2−1))
)
= O(r2 log |V |)
(this also holds with high probability). Each Gj yields a single-dimensional VC instance (where a
node may be owned by multiple players). Any truthful mechanism for a 1D-problem is a threshold
mechanism. So we can use any truthful, 2-approximation mechanism for single-dimensional VC for
the Gjs and obtain an O(r
2 log n)-approximation for r-dimensional VC.
The following lemma shows that the decomposition obtained above into single-dimensional
subgraphs is essentially the best that can hope for, for r = 2.
Lemma 4.9 There are instances of 2-dimensional VC that require Ω(log |V (G)|) single-dimensional
subgraphs in any decomposition of G.
Proof : Define Gn to be the bipartite graph with vertices {u1, . . . , un, v1, . . . , vn} and edges
{(ui, vj) : i 6= j}. Each agent i = 1, . . . , n owns vertices ui and vi.
For n = 2 the claim is obvious. Let qn be the minimum number of single-dimensional sub-
graphs needed to decompose Gn. Suppose the claim is true for all j < n and we have decom-
posed Gn into single-dimensional subgraphs D = {G1, . . . , Gqn}. We may assume that V (G1) =
{u1, . . . , uk, vk+1, . . . , vn} (if G1 has less than n nodes, pad it with extra nodes). Let H1 and H2
be the subgraphs of G induced by {u1, . . . , uk, v1, . . . , vk} and {uk+1, . . . , un, vk+1, . . . , vn}, respec-
tively. The graphs in D \{G1} must contain a decomposition of H1 and a decomposition of H2. So
qn ≥ 1+max(qk, qn−k), and hence, by induction, we obtain that qn ≥ 1+(1+log2(n/2)) = 1+log2 n.
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Complementing Theorem 4.8, we next present another decomposition mechanism that exploits
the graph structure to obtain an improved approximation guarantee. Given a graph G = (V,E)
and a set S ⊆ V , we use E[S] to denote the set of edges having both end points in S, and
N(S) = {u ∈ V \ S : ∃v ∈ S s.t. (u, v) ∈ E} to denote the neighbors of S. Also, let δ(S, T ) denote
the set of edges of G having one end point each in S and T . When we subscript a quantity (e.g.,
δ(S) or N(S)) with a specific graph, we are referring to the quantity in that specific graph.
Theorem 4.10 If G = (V,E) is everywhere γ-sparse, then one can devise a polytime, O(γr log |V |)-
approximation decomposition mechanism for r-dimensional VC on G. Hence, there is a polytime,
truthful, O(r log n)-approximation mechanism for r-dimensional VC on any proper minor-closed
family of graphs. These guarantees also hold when the Tis are not disjoint.
Proof : Set G = G0 = (V0, E0), and let n0 = |V0|. Since |E0| ≤ γn0, there are at most n0/2 nodes in
V0 with degree larger than 4γ. Let T1 = {u ∈ V0 : δ(u) ≤ 4γ}. LetH1 =
(
T1, E[T1]
)
be the subgraph
of G0 induced by T1. Also, consider the bipartite subgraph B1 =
(
T1∪NG0(T1), δG0(T1, NG0(T1))
)
.
Now, G1 = G0 \ T1 (i.e., we delete the nodes in T1 and the edges incident to them to obtain
G1) is also γ-sparse. So, we can similarly find a subgraph H2 that contains at least half of the
nodes of G1, and the bipartite subgraph B2 of G1. Continuing this process, we obtain subgraphs
H1, B1, H2, B2, . . . ,Hk, Bk that partitionG, where for every q, each node ofHq and each node on one
of the sides of Bq has degree (in that subgraph) at most 4γ, and |V (Hq)| ≥ |V (G\(T1∪ . . . Tq−1)|/2.
Hence, k ≤ log n. Using the (edge-threshold) mechanism A~1 defined in Corollary 4.4, for each Hq
subgraph gives a (4γ+1)-approximation for eachHq. Let Bq =
(
Tq∪Rq, Fq), where Rq = NGq−1(Tq),
and Fq = δGq−1(Tq, Rq).
Let T =
⋃
q Tq, R =
⋃
q Rq. Note that a node u could lie in T ∩R. We replace each such node
u ∈ T ∩R with two distinct “copies” u1 and u2, and place u1 in T and u2 in R. If u ∈ Ti for some
player i, then we include both u1, u2 in Ti, and set ci,u1 = ci,u2 = ci,u. The understanding is that if
any of u1 or u2 is picked, then we pick u; in other words, the threshold of u is the maximum of the
thresholds of u1 and u2. Let T unionmulti R denote the resulting set of nodes (with bipartition T,R). We
create a bipartite graph B = (T unionmulti R,F ) representing the union of all the Bqs, where F is defined
as follows. For notational simplicity, if a node u is in exactly one of T and R (so it has only one
copy in T unionmulti R), we set u1 = u2 = u. For every q = 1, . . . , k, and every edge (u, v) ∈ Fq, where
u ∈ Rq, v ∈ Tq, we include the edge (u2, v1) in F . Note that: (a) B is bipartite; (b) the maximum
degree of T (in B) is at most 4γ; and, (c) every edge in E \⋃q E(Hq) maps to exactly one edge of
F . We show that one can obtain an O(rγ log n)-approximation decomposition mechanism for B.
Thus, we obtain an O(rγ log n)-approximation decomposition mechanism for G.
We obtain O(r log n) bipartite graphs whose edges cover F , with the property that in each
resulting bipartite subgraph Z, for each node u ∈ R ∩ V (Z), and each agent i, at most one of u’s
neighbors in Z is in Ti. We use a procedure similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4.8. For each
i, we pick one node from T ∩Ti uniformly at random; let X be the set of nodes picked from T . We
create the bipartite graph Zj consisting of all edges between X and NB(X). We increment j and
continue this process until all edges of F have been covered. Since the probability that an edge
(u, v) ∈ F is covered in an iteration is at least 1r , O(r log n) subgraphs suffice, in expectation and
with high probability, to cover F .
Now, for each bipartite graph Zj with bipartition Xj ∪ Y j , where Xj ⊆ T, Y j ⊆ R, we use
the following threshold mechanism. Assume for now that the Tis are disjoint, and set cu = ci,u if
u ∈ Ti. For each u ∈ Y j , we pick u if cu ≤
∑
v∈N
Zj
(u) cv, and we pick NZj (u) if
∑
v∈N
Zj
(u) cv ≤ cu.
Note that since |Xj ∩ Ti| ≤ 1 for every i, this is a valid threshold mechanism. The cost of the
solution S output by this mechanism for Zj is at most 2
∑
u∈Y j c(S
∗
u), where S
∗
u is the optimal
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vertex cover for the star consisting of u and NZj (u). Since every node in X
j has degree at most 4γ,
it is not hard to see that
∑
u∈Y j c(S
∗
u) ≤ 4γ ·OPT (Zj), where OPT (Zj) is the value of an optimal
vertex cover for Zj . This follows since, for example, concatenating the optimal dual solutions
corresponding to the S∗us and scaling by 4γ yields a feasible solution to the dual of the vertex-cover
LP for Zj . Therefore, the threshold mechanism for Zj is an 8γ-approximation, and hence we obtain
an O(rγ log n)-approximation for B.
If the Tis are not disjoint, then by Remark 4.6, the O(γ)-approximation for the Hqs still holds.
When constructing Zj , we set the “owners” of a node v ∈ T included in Zj to be all the agents i
who picked v as the random node from their Ti-set (and hence caused v to be included in Zj); the
owners of a node u ∈ Y j are unchanged, that is, {i : u ∈ Ti}. Now, as in Remark 4.6, we can move
from this to an instance where each node is owned by at most one agent. Although the mechanism
described above for Zj is not a neighbor-threshold mechanism, it is not hard to see that since the
threshold for a node v ∈ T ∩V (Zj) depends only on nodes that are at hop-distance at most 2 from
v, none of which are owned by any agent owning v in Zj , the same reasoning as in Remark 4.6
shows that the O(γ)-approximation threshold mechanism obtained above for Zj holds even when a
node is owned by multiple agents. Thus, we still obtain an O(γr log |V |)-approximation mechanism.
As noted in Section 4.1, every proper minor-closed family of graphs is everywhere γ-sparse for
some γ > 0. Thus, the above result implies a truthful, O(r log2 n)-approximation for any proper
minor-closed family (where the constant in the O(.) depends on the graph family; e.g., for planar
graphs γ ≤ 4).
Given a graph G = (V,E), define a 3-hop-far instance of Multi-VC on G to be one that satisfies
|N(u)∩Ti| ≤ 1 for every u ∈ V and every agent i; that is no two neighbors of a node are owned by
the same agent. On such instances, one can improve the guarantee of Theorem 4.10 by removing
the dependence on maxi |Ti|.
Corollary 4.11 Let G = (V,E) be an everywhere γ-sparse graph. One can devise a polytime
O(γ log |V |)-approximation decomposition mechanism for 3-hop-far instances of Multi-VC on G.
Hence, one obtains a polytime, truthful O(log n)-approximation mechanism for 3-hop far Multi-VC
on any proper minor-closed family of graphs. These guarantees also hold when the Tis are not
disjoint.
Proof : The proof follows from that of Theorem 4.10. The only change is that we no longer need
to decompose the bipartite graph B into the Zj subgraphs: since the input is a 3-hop-far Multi-VC
instance, the Multi-VC instance on B already satisfies the property required of the Zj graphs. Thus,
we obtain an O(γ)-approximation for B, and an O(γ)-approximation for each Hq, and hence an
O(γ log |V |)-approximation for G. The consequences when the Tis are not necessarily disjoint, and
for a proper minor-closed family of graphs follow as in the proof of Theorem 4.10.
Frugality considerations. Karlin et al. [18] and Elkind et al. [6] propose various benchmarks
for measuring the frugality ratio of a mechanism, which is a measure of the (over-)payment of a
mechanism. The mechanisms that we devise above also enjoy good frugality ratios with respect
to the following benchmark introduced by [6], which is denoted by ν(G, c) in [19] (and NTUmax
in [6]).
Definition 4.12 (Frugality benchmark ν(G, c) [18, 6]) Given an instance of VC on a graph
G = (V,E) with node costs {cu}, we define ν(G, c) as follows. Fix an arbitrary min-cost vertex
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cover S (with respect to c).2
ν(G, c) := max
∑
v∈S
xv
s.t. xv ≥ cv for all v ∈ S∑
v∈S\T
xv ≤
∑
v∈T\S
cv for all vertex covers T .
The frugality ratio of a mechanism M =
(A, {pi}) on G is defined as φM (G) := supc ∑i pi(c)ν(G,c) . The
proof of Lemma 4.3 is easily modified to show that the x-scaled mechanism Ax satisfies
∑
i pi(c) ≤∑
u tu ≤ β(G;x)c(V ), where β(G;x) = maxu∈V x(N(u))xu . Since [6] show that ν(G, c) ≥ c(V )/2,
this implies that φAx(G) ≤ 2β(G;x). Also, if M is a decomposition mechanism constructed from
threshold mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mk, where each Mq satisfies
∑
u t
q
u ≤ φq · c(V (Gq)), then it is easy
to see that φM (G) ≤ 2
∑k
q=1 φq. Thus, we obtain the following results.
Theorem 4.13 Let G = (V,E) be a graph with n nodes. We can obtain a polytime, truthful, IR
mechanism M with the following approximation ρ = ρM (G) and frugality φ = φM (G) ratios.
(i) ρ = (β(G;x) + 1), φ ≤ 2β(G;x) for Multi-VC on G;
(ii) ρ = O(r2 log n), φ = O
(
r2 log n ·∆(G)) for r-dimensional VC on G (using a 2-approximation
mechanism with frugality ratio 2∆(G) [6] for single-dimensional VC in the construction of
Theorem 4.8);
(iii) ρ, φ = O(rγ log n) for r-dimensional VC on G when G is everywhere γ-sparse; hence, we
achieve ρ, φ = O(r log n) for r-dimensional VC on any proper minor-closed family.
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A Proof of Lemma 4.5
Statements (i) and (ii) follow from the statement for general graphs and the graph-theoretic facts
mentioned before Lemma 4.5, so we focus on proving the statement for an arbitrary graph G. Let
α′ = α′(G).
Consider an arbitrary vertex v ∈ V . For any u ∈ N(v) define x(uv)v := inf{σ ≥ 0 : tu(cv =
β, c−v = ~0) ≥ 1 ∀β ≥ σ}.
Claim 1: x
(uv)
v <∞. If not, then for any p > 0, there exists q ≥ p such that tu(cv = q, c−v = ~0) < 1.
So, let p = ρ and q ≥ p be such that tu(cv = q, c−v = ~0) < 1. Consider the cost vector c where
cu = 1, cv = q, and cz = 0 for z 6= u, v, we see that the approximation ratio ρ is contradicted for
the instance (G, c) (i.e., graph G with the cost vector c): V \ v is an optimal vertex cover of cost
1 but the threshold mechanism does not choose u so it chooses v as it is feasible and incurs cost
q > ρ.
Claim 2: x
(uv)
v > 0. If x
(uv)
v = 0, then similar to the above, by considering c where cu = 1, cv = ,
cz = 0 for z 6= u, v, where  is very small, we see that M outputs u, which means M does not have
the approximation ratio ρ.
Now orient the edges of G according to the orientation that determines α′(G) to obtain the
directed graph D. For any arc (u, v) in D, consider linear edge-threshold functions t
(uv)
v (cu) =
x
(uv)
v cu, and t
(uv)
u (cv) = (1/x
(uv)
v )cv. Using these edge-thresholds we obtain an edge-threshold
mechanism M ′. M ′ is feasible since for any arc (u, v) if u is not chosen by M ′, we should have
cu > t
(uv)
u (cv) = (1/x
(uv)
v )cv which implies t
(uv)
v (cu) = x
(uv)
v cu > cv hence v is chosen by M
′.
u′
v
u
t
(uv)
v (cu) = x
(uv)
v cut
(u′v)
v (cu′) =
cu′
x
(u′v)
u′
We assert that M ′ has approximation ratio O(ρ log(α′)). Note that if T is the outcome of M ′
and T ∗ is the optimal outcome, then we have
c(T ) = c(T ∩ T ∗) + c(T \ T ∗) ≤ c(T ∗) +
∑
w∈T\T ∗
max
u∈N(w)
t(uw)w (cu)
≤ c(T ∗) +
∑
w∈T\T ∗
∑
u∈N(w)
t(uw)w (cu) = c(T
∗) +
∑
w∈T\T ∗
u∈N(w)
cut
(uw)
w (1)
= c(T ∗) +
∑
u∈T ∗
cu
∑
w∈N(u)∩(T\T ∗)
t(uw)w (1) (since N(w) ⊆ T ∗ for w /∈ T ∗)
Note that T \ T ∗ is an independent set, so it suffices to show for any u ∈ V (G), if S ⊆ N(u)
forms an independent set then
∑
w∈S t
(uw)
w (1) ≤ ρ(log(α′) + 2).
Let δout(u) = {v : (u, v) ∈ D}, S1 := S ∩ δout(u), and S2 := S \ S1. So, we have∑
w∈S
t(uw)w (1) =
∑
w∈S1
t(uw)w (1) +
∑
w∈S2
t(uw)w (1) =
∑
w∈S1
x(uw)w +
∑
w∈S2
1
x
(uw)
u
(5)
Choose an arbitrary w ∈ S1. By definition of x(uw)w , for every w ≥ 0, there is some 0 ≤ δw ≤ w
such that tu(cw = x
(uw)
w − w + δw,~0) < 1. Hence, u /∈M(G, cˆ) where cˆw = x(uw)w − w + δw, cˆu = 1,
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and cˆz = 0 otherwise. So, since M(G, cˆ) is a vertex cover, we should have w ∈ M(G, cˆ) which
means tw(cu = 1,~0) ≥ x(uw)w − w + δw. Thus, as S1 is an independent set, for the cost vector c′
where c′u = 1, c′w = x
(uw)
w − w + δw if w ∈ S1, and c′z = 0 otherwise, we have S1 ⊆M(G, c′) (since
tw(c
′
N(w)) = tw(cu = 1,
~0)). Letting w tend to 0, we get that ρ ≥
∑
w∈S1 x
(uw)
w , as V \ N(u) is a
vertex cover of cost 1.
Let S2 = {v1, . . . , vk} where x(uv1)u ≤ x(uv2)u ≤ . . . ≤ x(uvk)u . Consider c′′ where c′′u = x(uvq)u ,
c′′z = 1 if z ∈ S2, and c′′z = 0 otherwise. Then, {v1, . . . , vq} ⊆ M(G, c′′) hence ρ ≥ q/x(uvl)u for each
q = 1, . . . , k. So,
∑k
q=1
1
x
(uvq)
u
≤∑kq=1 ρ/q ≤ ρ(log(|S2|) + 1) ≤ ρ log(α′) + ρ. Therefore, (5) gives∑
w∈S
t(uw)w (1) ≤ ρ+ ρ log(α′) + ρ = ρ(log(α′) + 2).
B LP-rounding does not work for Multi-VC
A common method for designing approximation algorithms for VC (and in general) is to solve the
following LP-relaxation and then round the optimal solution.
min
∑
v
cvxv s.t. xu + xv ≥ 1 ∀(u, v) ∈ E. (VC-P)
We show that any LP-rounding algorithm that always includes nodes with xu ≥ 12 and does not
include any node u with xu = 0 is not WMON.
Example 2 Consider the graph G shown below where u and v belong to agent 1. For the cost-
vector (cu, ca, cb, cv, cd) = (5/4, 1, 1, 1, 1), the unique optimal solution to the LP is (xu, xa, xb, xv, xd) =
(1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2). Therefore, the algorithm includes both u and v in the output.
d
v b
a
u
5
4 ↘ 98
1
1↘  1
1
G
Consider the cost vector c′ = (c′1, c−1) where agent 1 reduces the costs for u and v to c′u = 9/8
and c′v =  < 1/16 (all other costs are unchanged). Then WMON dictates that both u and
v must still be chosen. However, the unique optimal solution to the LP with the new costs is
xa = xd = xv = 1, xu = xb = 0 with cost 2 + . (This follows because if xu = 1 then the cost of an
LP solution is at least 1+9/8; if xu = 1/2, then the cost of an LP solution is at least 9/16+1+1/2;
both are greater than 2 +  as  < 1/16.) So M will not output u, which contradicts WMON.
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The above example also shows that the following well-known combinatorial 2-approximation
algorithm for VC does not satisfy WMON: Given a graph G = (V,E), construct a bipartite graph
G′ having two copies of V , say V1, V2, and having edges (u1, v2), (u2, v1) for every edge (u, v) ∈ E;
solve VC on G′ and if any of the copies of a node are chosen in this solution, then pick that node
in the solution for G.
In the above example, for the cost-vector c, every optimal vertex cover for G′ includes exactly
one copy of u and one copy of v, so both u and v will be chosen in the solution for G. For the
cost-vector c′, no optimal vertex cover for G′ includes any copies of u, so u will not be chosen in
the solution for G. This contradicts WMON.
C Primal-dual methods do not work for Multi-VC
The dual of (VC-P) is as follows.
max
∑
e
ye s.t.
∑
e∈δ(v)
ye ≤ cv ∀v ∈ V. (VC-D)
Various primal-dual algorithm based on dual ascent are known to yield 2-approximation algorithms.
All of these start with y = ~0, raise dual variables while maintaining dual feasibility, and return the
nodes whose costs are completely “paid” by the dual variables.
The two most common variants are where one fixes an ordering of the edges in which to raise
dual variables, and where one raises all (unfrozen) dual variables simultaneously. We show that
neither of these lead to WMON algorithms.
Example 3 Consider the graph shown in Fig. 1, where the dual variables are increased in the
order ux, xy, yv, and u and v belong to one agent.
Let cu = 1, cx = 1.5, cy = 1.05, cv = 0.5. The primal-dual algorithm will output {u, x, v}.
Now, if we reduce cu to 0.5 and cv to 0.3, and keep cx and cy unchanged, the algorithm outputs
{u, x, y} which contradicts WMON.
y x
uv
1.05 1.5
1↘ 0.50.3↙ 0.5
Figure 1:
Example 4 Now consider the simultaneous-dual-ascent primal-dual algorithm. Consider again
the same graph as in Example 3 but with a different assignment of costs, as shown in Fig. 2. Let
cu = 1, cx = 3, cy = 4.6, cv = 2.5. The primal-dual algorithm outputs {u, x, v}. Now, if we
reduce cu to 0.5 and cv to 2.4 and keep cx and cy unchanged, the algorithm outputs {u, y}, which
contradicts WMON.
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y x
uv
4.6 3
1↘ 0.52.4↙ 2.5
Figure 2:
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